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This article examines the case of local self-government re-
form in Croatia between 1993, when a new system of lo-
cal self-government was introduced after the country had 
gained its independence and 2017, when the most recent 
changes to the system were introduced. In the literature un-
favourable reform outcomes are explained either by means 
of the rational-instrumental perspective or the power and 
conflict perspective. The aim of the article is to offer an 
understanding of the reform outcomes by focussing on the 
preceding processes, adopting the garbage can perspective 
as an explanatory model. The author argues that reform 
outcomes are, at least in part, a result of the garbage can 
model of decision-making. The model emerged because 
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changes took place in a turbulent setting characterised by 
low state administrative capacity. 
Keywords: garbage can model, local self-government, re-
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1. Introduction
Some form of local self-government with guaranteed local autonomy is 
ubiquitous to all democratic countries. This is because the idea of decen-
tralisation is closely related to the democratic principles of participation 
and separation of powers, but also because it serves the “technocratic” 
argument of better problem-solving. In order to achieve better quality 
of decisions, it is wise to engage actors that are close to the problem – 
those with contextual knowledge – in the decision-making process. Local 
governance thus has a dual purpose, both to consolidate democracy and 
increase the effectiveness of the public administration system as a whole 
(Holtmann & Rademacher, 2016, p. 287). Achieving these purposes may 
depend on organisational structure. Governance outcomes are at least in 
part susceptible to the manipulation of organisational factors: organisa-
tional structure, demography, culture, and location (Egeberg, Gornitzka 
& Trondal, 2016, p. 32). 
With that in mind, the aim of this paper is not to explore how different or-
ganisational structures affect governance, but rather the focus is on struc-
ture as an outcome of organisational reform. The question is: how did 
local-level governance structures emerge as they did? Or, in other words, 
how does the process of organisational change affect the final structure? 
Organisational structure is thus treated as a dependent variable of or-
ganisational change. Perspectives on organisational change considered in 
the paper are the rational-instrumental perspective, the power and con-
flict perspective, and the garbage can perspective (Egeberg, Gornitzka & 
Trondal, 2016). 
Empirically, the paper discusses the reorganisation of local- and mid-
dle-level government structures in Croatia. The relevant time period is 
between early 1993, when the new Law on Local Self-Government came 
into effect and 2017, when the last reform of the system took place. With-
in that timeframe, changes to the system were made almost yearly and 
the solutions reached have generally been heavily criticised. Changes 
introduced over the years are deemed to have been “badly improvised” 
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(Kregar, 1999, p. 146) and the system has been described as “schizo-
phrenic” (Koprić, 2014, p. 12), “controversial” (Koprić, 2015, p. 994), and 
“absurd” (Blažević, 2016, p. 333).1 
In the explanation of reform outcomes, two perspectives prevail in the 
literature on Croatian local self-government reform: the rational-instru-
mental and the power and conflict perspective. Within the first perspec-
tive, reform outcomes are a product of conscious decision-makers. The 
territorial organisation of local and regional self-government starting in 
1993 was conceived in such a way as to ensure the centralist administra-
tion of public affairs and this persisted through the years. Though some 
steps towards decentralisation have been taken, especially since 2000, to 
this day Croatia continues to be a highly centralised country, because that 
is what suits the decision-makers. Within the power and conflict perspec-
tive, however, it is recognised that different political actors have different 
interests and goals and that the current organisational structure is the 
result of the power relations and bargaining processes amongst them. 
This paper argues that in addition to the rational-instrumental and power 
and conflict perspectives, reform outcomes can, at least to some degree, 
be attributed to the garbage can model of decision-making. The garbage 
can model of organisational decision-making can offer new and interest-
ing insights with regard to reorganisational efforts at local levels of gov-
ernment in Croatia. The aim of the paper is to offer an understanding of 
the reform outcomes by focussing on the preceding processes, adopting 
the garbage can perspective as an explanatory model. In addition, the pa-
per establishes that the garbage can model has taken place in Croatia due 
to low state administrative capacity and a rapidly changing environment, 
thus adding theoretical value to garbage can insights.
The paper is structured as follows: the first part lays out the theory be-
hind the garbage can model of decision-making, the second part describes 
the development of local self-government in Croatia since the 1990s, the 
third chapter discusses why the reform efforts can in part be seen as a 
product of garbage can processes, and the final part concludes the paper. 
1 There are authors whose positions on reform outcomes seem to be less critical. 
Lozina, for example, holds that some municipalities have undoubtedly prospered under the 
new system (Lozina, 2004, p. 140). 
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2. Garbage Can Model of Organisational  
Change
The traditional approach to organisational change assumes a rational-in-
strumental position, wherein organisational change is an instrument em-
ployed by political and administrative leaders to achieve certain goals. 
This approach assumes both that relevant actors can manipulate different 
organisational factors in order to achieve a desired objective and that they 
know how different structural solutions contribute to the realisation of 
a certain end (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016, p. 39). The issue 
here is how to achieve a rational design. Reorganisation will fail if the 
design is not adjusted to the desired goals, whatever they may be. For 
instance, in the local government reorganisation setting, if the goal is to 
establish strong, autonomous, and financially independent municipalities, 
amalgamation of small municipalities is the rational solution. Hence local 
government reforms in many European countries in the second half of 
the 20th century were directed towards the amalgamation of previously 
smaller local units in an effort to make them more financially independ-
ent and to ease the financial burden of operating a large administrative 
system.2 Through a process of active analytical problem-solving, actors 
choose amongst alternative design options by using a decision rule that 
compares alternatives in terms of their expected consequences for goals 
that have already been established and are known (Egeberg, Gornitzka & 
Trondal, 2016, p. 39). In light of this perspective, reform fails because de-
cision-makers are not always able to recognise the consequences of their 
choices. It is thus often recommended that expert knowledge be included 
in reform design. 
The other perspective often employed in explaining reorganisation out-
comes is the power and conflict perspective. The starting point is the same 
as in the case of the rational-instrumental perspective: change is a prod-
uct of rational actors who have prior preferences and act on the basis of 
anticipated consequences. The difference here is that the power and con-
flict perspective recognises that actors have different, conflicting interests 
attached to organisations and possess different resources to pursue their 
goals. Thus existing organisational structures are a reflection of different 
political interests and bargaining processes that have taken place at some 
2 Sweden, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway are 
some of these countries. France and Switzerland present a rare exception to this trend.
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point in time (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016, p. 40). In light of 
this perspective, decision-makers seem to be driven by self-interest, poli-
ticians want to be re-elected, and bureaucrats want to further their career 
opportunities (Cohen & Karatzmas, 2016, p. 174). Because the existing 
organisational structures are a result of previous bargains, every initiative 
for reorganisation is likely to stir up old conflicts and activate potential 
veto players (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016, p. 40).
In contrast to the rational-instrumental and the conflict-oriented per-
spective, this paper discusses the garbage can model of organisational 
decision-making as an additional explanation of reorganisation outcomes. 
This theoretical model was proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen in 
their seminal article “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice” 
in 1972 in an effort to explain why dysfunctional organisations persist 
or “how organizations survive when they do not know what they are do-
ing”  (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 11).  The authors argue that pub-
lic sector organisations will at times act as organised anarchies, which 
means that they will have problematic preferences, unclear technology, 
or fluid participation. At the same time, the organisation is a collection 
of decision-making situations or choice opportunities which are nothing 
but garbage cans, into which various kinds of problems and solutions are 
dumped by participants (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 2). Unlike the 
rational model of decision-making, where the final decision is reached 
after a careful evaluation of alternatives in the light of preferred goals, in 
the garbage can model the decision-making process is somewhat dysfunc-
tional. The decision is a result of the interplay between several relatively 
independent streams within the organisation: problems, solutions, partici-
pants, and choice opportunities. Problems refer to the concerns of people, 
decision-makers, inside or outside the organisation (such as money issues, 
family, career, and the like). The solution is a product of a participant in 
the decision-making process. However, it is not always the case that solu-
tions come after a problem has been recognised. Solutions may be looking 
for problems rather than the other way around. The authors compare this 
effect to the one brought about by the introduction of a new product to a 
market: rather than fulfilling a need, it creates a need among consumers. 
Participants in the decision-making process are characterised by the fact 
that they are simultaneously engaged in several decision-making process-
es, they have different obligations, so they “come and go” (Cohen, March 
& Olsen, 1972, p. 3). 
Generally, organisational decision-making is characterised by three types 
of decisions: decision by resolution, oversight, and flight. Resolution of 
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problems is the least likely type of decision to be employed in the garbage 
can situation. This is a decision-making style in line with the tradition-
al, instrumental-rational view of the organisation, where choices resolve 
problems after they have been worked on for some time. The two oth-
er types of decisions prevail: decision-making by oversight and by flight. 
Oversight occurs when there is a choice opportunity, but decision-makers 
ignore existing problems when choosing a solution. Whilst such suppres-
sion of problems may eliminate a considerable amount of ambiguity, it 
means that potentially critical issues may remain unresolved for extended 
periods (Wiesel, Model & Moll, 2011, p. 554). Finally, in some cases 
choices are unsuccessfully associated with problems for some time, until 
a choice more attractive/appropriate to the problems comes along. Some 
problems will then leave the choice opportunity, and it will be possible to 
reach a decision; however, this does not mean the problems have been 
solved. This seems to explain the impression that organisations make de-
cisions yet make no progress in resolving the problems that appear to be 
related to the decisions. (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). The garbage can 
process will rarely result in successful problem resolution because pre-ex-
isting and “given” solutions become attached to ill-defined or ambiguous 
problems (Cohen & Karatzmas, 2016, p. 175). 
Whether garbage can features are desirable in organisations or not is de-
batable. There is a view that, although damaging to the rationality and 
instrumentality of public decisions, the garbage can model may have its 
advantages, such as creating a more open and innovative process (Chris-
tensen, 2011, p. 227). 
According to March and Olsen, reorganisation is especially susceptible to 
garbage can decision-making: “the general absence of precise rules con-
trolling access makes it likely that reorganizations will become garbage 
cans, highly contextual combinations of people, choice opportunities, 
problems and solutions” (March & Olsen, 1983, p. 286). The problem 
is not so much that politicians and decision-makers act primarily with 
self-interest in mind, but lies in how to attract their attention. “Presidents, 
congressional leaders, major interest groups, and higher civil servants are 
typically too busy to be more than very occasional participants. As a result, 
reorganization efforts often operate in an attention vacuum with respect 
to those political figures who are likely to be most supportive” (March & 
Olsen, 1983, p. 286). Reorganisation thus becomes a competition for a 
scarce resource: attention. War, scandal, or another crisis will divert de-
cision-makers’ attention away from reorganisation and short-term goals 
will prevail. Additionally, whilst political leaders and other major political 
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supporters of reorganisation are hard-pressed to maintain their attention 
on the issue, less central actors move to the forefront. Because reorganisa-
tion involves discussions about institutional goals and long-term planning, 
it attracts numerous otherwise unoccupied participants and unresolved 
issues. Reorganisation turns into “an arena for debating a wide range of 
current concerns and ancient philosophies” (March & Olsen, 1983, p. 
286). “Since there are few established rules of relevance and access, reor-
ganizations tend to become collections of solutions looking for problems, 
ideologies looking for soapboxes, pet projects looking for supporters, and 
people looking for jobs, reputations or entertainment” (March & Olsen, 
1983, p. 286).3 
The three selected models of organisational change represent ideal types 
(lenses) whereby reorganisation can be understood. In practice, a com-
plicated interplay of all three models is in place. It exceeds the scope 
of this paper to establish to what extent the reorganisation process of 
local self-government system in Croatia should be ascribed to the ration-
al-instrumental, power and conflict, or garbage can perspectives. “Choice 
opportunities” opened up more than once during the time period under 
consideration. It is possible that some parts of the reform process could 
be explained by bargaining processes – actors in pursuance of their nar-
row goals – but not necessarily other parts. The paper thus points to situ-
ations of Croatian reorganisation efforts in the last 25 years that have had 
garbage can characteristics.
3 It is important to note the difference between the power and conflict and the gar-
bage can perspective. In practice, it can be argued that a situation in which actors start 
out with rational motives, find themselves in the political arena with other stakeholders 
who have different but equally rational perspectives, and then through side-payments and 
bargains try to further their goals, can be described as anarchic. However, this is different 
from a situation of “organized anarchy” as explained by Cohen, March and Olsen. They 
emphasize the “fluidity of participation”. This means that actors may be rational in their 
perspective, but their attention is scarce; they are engaged in different (both public and 
private) decision-making arenas at the same time. Indeed, some decision-makers will bene-
fit from anarchic circumstances but not because they have more power, resources, or skills 
than others (which is what the power and conflict perspective suggests). In the garbage can 
model, reorganisation outcome depends on the temporal links between what Cohen, March 
and Olsen (1972) identify as problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. 
Anarchic circumstances will benefit those actors that at a certain choice opportunity have 
their attention on a certain problem or maybe solution (because problems and solutions are 
interchangeable in the original theory; both can trigger change).
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Table 1. Comparison of perspectives on organisational change
Rational-instrumental 
perspective
Power and 
conflict 
perspective
Garbage can 
perspective
Nature of 
actors 
Rational actors 
who have prior 
preferences and 
act on the basis 
of anticipated 
consequences.
Rational actors 
who have prior 
preferences and 
act on the basis 
of anticipated 
consequences 
but who also 
have different 
and conflicting 
interests. 
Actors are 
simultaneously 
engaged in several 
decision-making 
processes, they have 
different obligations, 
and they “come and 
go” in the decision-
making arena.
How 
reorganisation 
(change) is 
understood 
and explained
Relevant actors 
manipulate different 
organisational 
factors in order to 
achieve a desired 
objective. Through 
a process of active 
analytical problem-
solving actors choose 
amongst alternative 
design options, 
using a decision 
rule that compares 
alternatives in terms 
of their expected 
consequences.
Existing 
organisational 
structures 
are a result 
of previous 
bargains 
amongst 
actors. Every 
initiative for 
reorganisation 
reopens the 
bargaining 
process.
Change is a result 
of interplay between 
several relatively 
independent 
streams: problems, 
solutions, 
participants, 
and choice 
opportunities. Links 
between them are 
temporal not causal, 
so depending on 
their time of arrival 
in the “garbage 
can”, any problem 
can be linked to any 
solution.
Main 
challenge of 
reorganisation 
There is a need for 
expert knowledge, 
because politicians, 
in order to make a 
decision, need to 
know how different 
structural solutions 
contribute to the 
realisation of a 
certain end.
Balancing 
preferences and 
power relations 
among actors.
Attracting and 
retaining decision-
makers’ attention. 
Source: Author based on Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016. 
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3.  Overview of Croatian Decentralisation  
Efforts Since 1990
The well-known notion that reform is constant in public administration 
seems to especially hold true for the Croatian system of local self-govern-
ment. After the country gained independence in 1990, the development 
of the Croatian local self-government system can be roughly divided into 
two stages, the relevant year being 2000. The current territorial structure 
was introduced in the midst of war in the beginning of 1993, with almost a 
third of the state territory under occupation. The first elections under the 
new system were held in February of 1993. Reform introduced 487 units 
at the lowest level of government, with a distinction between (418) rural 
municipalities (općine) and (69) urban towns (gradovi). At the middle lev-
el, 20 counties (županije) were established. The country capital, Zagreb, 
continues to enjoy the dual status of county and town to this day. This 
was quite a radical departure from the system that used to be in place in 
the socialist era (1967–1990). The territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia was divided into 102–114 municipalities at the local level and 
10 associations of municipalities (zajednice općina) at the middle level of 
government (Blažević, 2016, p. 329). The political system structure at 
the local level mimicked that at the central level. The reform introduced 
a representative council/assembly, a mayor/governor, and an executive 
committee in all local units. 
The system in place during the 1990s came under severe criticism. It was 
characterised as extremely centralised and politicised (Koprić, Dubajić & 
Tomić, 2015, p. 478). A major issue was the overly fragmented territorial 
structure with far too small local units. What was more, the number of 
towns and municipalities continued to grow throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Additionally, the distinction between towns and municipalities 
was problematic. Ivanišević argues that the distinction between urban 
and rural areas, mostly abandoned in Western European countries, can 
be justified in Croatia because it is a country with a relatively low degree 
of urbanisation. The problem is that this distinction has not been applied 
consistently. There was and continues to be a sort of decoupling between 
legislation and implementation. In reality, the differences between pow-
ers vested in towns and those vested in municipalities are insignificant 
and supervision by county authorities is equally inclusive and intense, so it 
could be said that their status is equal (Ivanišević, 2003, p. 25). The prob-
lem is further aggravated by the constant increase in the number of towns 
(i.e., as a result of granting town status to previous communes). Koprić 
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argues that close to one third of towns are not actually urban areas. Out 
of 128 towns, 55 acquired their status due to a very flexible interpretation 
of the legislation (Koprić, 2016, p 45).
With regard to middle-level units, counties, in the legislation they were, 
somewhat unusually, defined as both central government “departmental 
units” (područne jedinice) and “regional self–government units” (regionalne 
jedinice). Each county assembly needed to nominate two representatives 
to the House of Counties. Until 2001 the Croatian Parliament was bi-
cameral, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of 
Counties. Reflecting the territorial composition of the country, the lat-
ter had the role of promoting and guarding regional interests; however, 
in reality, counties mostly acted as “departmental” rather than “regional 
self-government units” (Ivanišević, 2003, p. 25). During the 1990s, their 
work mostly focused on state administrative affairs, with the addition of 
limited coordination and supervision competences over the activities of 
municipalities and towns. The county governor (župan) was the “state 
representative in the county”. Having been elected by the county assem-
bly, he or she had to be confirmed by the president of Croatia. This led to 
a crisis in the election of the mayor of Zagreb in 1995.4 The institution of 
county governor had some similarities with the earlier institution of pre-
fect in French departments, which was used to ensure state control over 
local levels of government (Koprić, 2012, p. 2). 
Furthermore, counties, promoted as “regions”, did not really coincide 
with areas of specific historical and cultural identity, and many historical 
regions were divided into several counties. The artificial division of the 
island of Pag between two counties is often invoked as an example of 
the absurdity of the new solution (Blažević, 2016, p. 333). Likewise, two 
counties (Zagreb and Dubrovačko-Neretvanska) were composed of geo-
graphically unconnected parts. The Dubrovačko-Neretvanska County has 
remained in this state to this day (Ivanišević, 2003, p. 23). Local democ-
racy processes and institutions were also troublesome: because executive 
committee members received payment for the function they performed, 
this was financially draining on already weak municipalities, towns, and 
counties (Blažević, 2016, pp. 331–336). 
4 During 1995 and 1996 President Tuđman refused to confirm four consecutive may-
ors elected by the county assembly (Dražen Budiša, Goran Granić, Jozo Radoš, and Ivo 
Škrabalo) because they were members of the opposition. This contributed to a mass protest 
that took place in the city in November of 1996. The crisis was not resolved until the subse-
quent regular elections in 1997 (Šantić, 2014, p. 4).
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The second stage of local government development was introduced by the 
amendments made to the Croatian Constitution in 2000. With the turn 
of the century and a left-wing coalition in charge, the system was set on 
a path to decentralisation. Several international legal instruments, which 
promoted the political, administrative, and financial independence of lo-
cal authorities were ratified and introduced into the Croatian legal sys-
tem.5 A new Law on Local and Regional Self-Government was adopted in 
2001 and bicameralism was abolished in the same year. Likewise, starting 
in 2001, the president no longer needed to confirm county governors. The 
plan was to achieve decentralisation in four sectors: education, health, 
social welfare, and fire services. However, only the decentralisation of fire 
services was somewhat successful (Koprić & Đulabić, 2018, p. 247).
Efforts to achieve decentralisation were lacking because, in spite of initi-
atives to amalgamate small municipalities, their number was not reduced. 
The system continued to fragment, which worked against the decentrali-
sation efforts. In 2005 a new category of local units was introduced: large 
towns (veliki gradovi). This status was granted to 17 towns with a popula-
tion of 35,000 or more. Their scope of affairs was slightly broadened to 
include maintenance of public roads and issuance of location and build-
ing permits as well as other documents in the realm of construction and 
spatial planning. These had previously used to be county affairs (Koprić, 
2016, pp. 47–48).
The number of counties was not reduced either, nor was it adjusted to 
coincide with natural and historical regions. Some optimistically believed 
that in time counties would “fade away” because they served no particu-
lar purpose: they were far too small to be considered regional units and 
virtually all local service provision was entrusted to towns and munici-
palities. On the contrary, however, during the 2000s the counties grew 
stronger. Smaller towns and municipalities turned out to be severely un-
dercapacitated in terms of financial, human, and organisational resources 
to organise even elementary services, so the counties took over their role 
by providing services to citizens in health, education, social welfare, and 
other areas. First-level units, except for some towns and large municipali-
ties, in effect served only as places of interest articulation without any real 
capacity or the means to take action. In fact, out of over 550 towns and 
5 The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Terri-
torial Communities or Authorities (OG – MU 10/03) was ratified in 2003 and in 2008 the 
European Charter on Local Self-Government was ratified in its entirety (OG – MU 4/08).  
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municipalities only 33 were able to undertake tasks that the Constitution 
had envisioned for them (Koprić, 2014, p. 11).6 
In November of 2001, Croatia embarked on a long accession process to 
the EU, which introduced new challenges for local structures. Amongst 
other things, the EU expected strong middle-level government: large re-
gions with the primary function of promoting and generating economic 
development. In 2009 and then again in late 2014, the Law on Regional 
Development was introduced. Relying on the statistical division of the 
country into two statistical regions – Adriatic Croatia and Coastal Croatia 
– the law introduced partnership councils in each unit. At the same time, 
the law introduced the option of larger towns forming urban agglomera-
tions and urban areas, rendering the institutional environment of subna-
tional governance more complex and not necessarily more democratic or 
effective. 
With regard to local political bodies, there has been a tendency to strength-
en the position of local mayors and governors. First, in 2009 executive 
committees were abolished and direct elections of mayor and governor 
were introduced. Then in 2017 their position was further strengthened in 
the budget process at the expense of the representative body. Namely, the 
current legislation enables mayors and governors to manipulate the budg-
eting process in such a way as to provoke the dissolution of the assembly 
while they themselves remain in power. The final result is local executives 
who are virtually untouchable. 
The last 25 years of development of local government in Croatia may 
be viewed as a single, continuous attempt at reorganisation. The general 
view is that the system in place before Croatian independence, during the 
socialist era, although lacking in democracy, was much more rational than 
the current one (Blažević, 2016, p. 341). The view is that the system was 
given a “bad start” with radical and abrupt reform at the beginning of the 
1990s. Changes introduced afterwards have not been successful, except 
for the promotion of the democratic principles of governance – to some 
extent. 
6 Currently (in 2018), there are 34 towns that have undertaken the following decen-
tralised functions: elementary and secondary schooling, social welfare, health care, and fire 
services (Regulation on the Financing of Decentralized Functions, OG 7/18).
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4.  Garbage Can Model as an Explanation of Local 
Self-Government Reorganisation Outcomes  
in Croatia
The outcomes of local government reform initiatives in Croatia since the 
early 1990s have been well documented in the literature and are usually 
explained either through the lens of the rational-instrumental perspective 
or the power and conflict perspective. This paper proposes that the reor-
ganisation outcomes are at least in part the product of the garbage can 
decision-making process. 
In light of the rational-instrumental perspective, decision-makers can and 
know how to manipulate organisational factors, such as organisational 
structure, to achieve certain goals. Their goals can be noble, such as the 
promotion of the democratic principles of governance or enabling bet-
ter problem-solving, but they can also be selfish. They can act so as to 
assure their own base interests, money, political patronage, and the like. 
Whatever the motives are, the assumption is that the reform outcome will 
be successful if the design is rational and in line with those motives and 
purposes. With that in mind, the organisational structure of local gov-
ernment may vary from one country to another. If the goal is to have a 
fairly centralised country with strong central control, the network of local 
structures will look different than in a system which strives to achieve 
strong and autonomous municipalities (Ivanišević, 2006, p. 199). In light 
of this perspective, fragmented territorial division in Croatia may be seen 
as a consequence of rational choice. It can be argued that Croatia, unlike 
most European countries in the late 20th century, opted for small munic-
ipalities in order to foster much needed democracy and local participa-
tion after it had emerged from an undemocratic regime (Koprić, 2012, 
p. 1179). Thus the final design of local government structures reflects the 
decision-makers’ choice to, due to the circumstances, give way to democ-
racy rather than efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative system 
as a whole. Similarly, the severe centralisation of decision-making, espe-
cially in the early years of independence, may be seen as an answer to war 
and a general state of crisis that requires such a decision-making style 
(Koprić, 2014, p. 10; Đulabić, 2018, p. 458).7
7 Koprić, namely, warns that the territorial division introduced in 1993 established 
a perfectly rational hierarchical system, whereby the central government was overseeing 20 
counties, and each county around 24 towns and municipalities. Such territorial division was 
ideal for centralistic decision-making (Koprić, 2014, p. 10).
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Within this perspective it has also been argued that the fragmented territo-
rial structure in the 1990s was a way to assure the dominance of Tuđman’s 
centre-right political party: HDZ (the Croatian Democratic Union). The 
structure was designed so as to assure one-party control in the majority of 
municipalities, if not all. 
This perspective also lies behind the supranational legislation on local 
self-government Croatia was subjected to throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. The majority of legal instruments of the EU and the Council of 
Europe have been formulated so as to serve as guidance for local deci-
sion-makers on goals, values, and purposes to be taken into account when 
establishing or reorganising local government structures. Many of these 
have been formulated with young democracies in mind or in light of pre-
paring countries to implement the principles of European administrative 
space. The underlying position is rational-instrumental and assumes that 
reform success depends on the actions of the actors. As long as they have 
the right “mindset”, a rational design is obtainable and reform successful. 
According to a different line of reasoning, the main obstacles to success-
ful local-level government reform in Croatia are the divergent interests 
of actors: political parties, local and central government bureaucrats and 
politicians, local citizens, and others. The established structures reflect 
the existence of asymmetrical power relations between these actors (Ko-
prić, 1999, p. 606). This reasoning is in line with the power and conflict 
perspective. The existing local government structure in Croatia is thus a 
result of previous bargains between actors. Reorganisation processes are 
challenging because they are likely to stir up old conflicts and activate 
potential veto players (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016, p. 40). For 
example, the regional IDS party (the Istrian Democratic Assembly) was 
part of the governing coalition (the Kukuriku Coalition) in the 2011–2015 
parliamentary term and particularly during this period acted as a strong 
veto player in an attempt at second-tier government reorganisation.
Both the rational-instrumental and the power and conflict perspective are 
fundamentally similar, because they assume that change is a product of 
intentionally rational actors. These actors have prior preferences and act 
on the basis of anticipated consequences (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 
2016, p. 40). They are expected to have complete insight into the reor-
ganisation processes, full knowledge of the challenges of reform at hand, 
and few attention problems (Lægreid, Christensen & Rykkja, 2016, p. 24)
In addition to the rational-instrumental and the power and conflict per-
spectives in explaining the outcomes of local self-government reorganisa-
tion in Croatia, a third explanation is possible: the current state is partly a 
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result of the garbage can process of decision-making. The reform process 
is characterised by ambiguous goals and unclear preferences, as well as 
fluid participation.
Considering the first attempt at reorganisation, in the early 90s, the re-
organisation actors had a different view of the situation they were facing. 
Public administration experts argued that local self-government reorgani-
sation constituted a complex reform that should not be rushed, especially 
in the midst of war, and consequently argued against it (Blažević, 2016). 
The newly established centre-right government (HDZ), on the other 
hand, insisted on reform and fragmentation of the system for fear that big 
municipalities inherited from the socialist era (with an average population 
of 45,000) could establish themselves as the focal points of a strong oppo-
sition and resistance to the central government (Koprić, 2001, p. 65). Ad-
ditionally, reorganisation had a strong symbolic purpose because the gov-
ernment strived to establish discontinuity with the previous regime at all 
costs. Namely, the socialist period, in line with official Marxist doctrine, 
had been characterised by strong local municipalities which provided nu-
merous services. Thus many believed the notion of local decision-making 
to be a relic of the past that ought to be eradicated. Symbolic features are 
typical of the garbage can process because symbols are used to make pro-
cesses appear more rational. At the same time, they add to the complexity 
and ambiguity of processes (Christensen, 2011, p. 227). Thus different 
actors envisioned different goals for the system in place and operated on 
the basis of different interpretations of the problem. 
Goal ambiguity is also evident in the efforts to establish middle-level gov-
ernment units. There were several problems as well as solutions “attached” 
to the reorganisational framework. Decision-makers appeared to have 
different ideas about the nature of counties. There was no shared view 
as to whether they should be governmental departments or autonomous 
self-governing entities. The result was an unusual and ambiguous legisla-
tive definition of counties as “units of departmental (regional) self-gov-
ernment” (jedinice područne (regionalne) samouprave). To some extent, 
Šimunović recognises the garbage-can nature of decision-making in the 
process of establishing middle-level government in Croatia. He argues, in 
line with the ideas of Cohen, March and Olsen, that a lack of attention 
was a crucial problem of the decision-makers. Namely, in the early 1990s 
the decision-makers were preoccupied with establishing Croatia as an in-
dependent state; therefore, little to no attention could be devoted to the 
establishment of regional-level self-government units (Šimunović, 1992, 
p. 47). 
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Not only did EU accession bring in a new actor, but new problems and 
solutions also rushed into the reorganisation arena. All of the post-2000 
governments had EU accession at the top of their political agenda and 
local self-government reorganisation was partially used to serve that goal. 
This can be seen in the introduction of statistical regions for the purpos-
es of the EU cohesion policy. They exist in parallel to counties, but still 
do not offer an answer to the problem of inefficient regional actors with 
insufficient financial, professional, and other capacities. Thus with regard 
to establishing both local- and middle-level government units, different 
participants acted upon different definitions of the situation (March & 
Olsen, 1983, p. 287).
According to Christensen, the garbage can perspective is often used to 
focus on processes that have special features, such as decisions that take 
place over a long period of time, are particularly complex or emotive, or 
are subject to fluctuations and unexpected events (Christensen, 2011, p. 
227). This all seems to be the case regarding the reorganisation at hand: it 
took place over a longer time period and within a fluctuating environment 
characterised by transition and war during the first years of the reorgan-
isation efforts, and later with the change of the international community 
and the EU accession process. Additionally, this particular reorganisation 
took place within a framework of a young or immature set of organisations 
because having once gained independence, Croatia was faced with the 
task of establishing its own administrative system. Many administrative 
tasks had previously been performed by the federal government in Bel-
grade, such as foreign affairs, customs administration, diplomacy, and the 
like (Blažević, 2016, p. 272). Such an environment further contributed to 
the complexity of the reform. The “frantic” outcome of local self-govern-
ment reform in Croatia, with dysfunctional local- and middle-level units, 
can thus be explained by taking into consideration the backdrop of the 
reorganisation efforts and multiple and ever-changing reform goals. 
5.  Conclusion
Efforts at decentralisation in Croatia have been well documented in the 
literature. The reorganisation outcomes have generally been criticised and 
there is agreement that the solution in place is inadequate, at least regard-
ing the technical function of local self-government. The main critique is 
that the first-tier units, especially municipalities, are too small and finan-
cially weak to provide public services to citizens and operate effectively. As 
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for the second-tier units, the counties, even though they were conceived 
as the country’s regions, they are in fact artificially constructed entities 
which do not coincide with Croatia’s natural and historic regions. Even 
though the Law on Regional Development, enacted under EU pressure, 
provides governance structures beyond counties (in statistical regions and 
urban agglomerations and areas) the state still lacks true regionalisation. 
What is more, these new structures only complicate a system that, due 
to fragmentation and rural/urban differentiation, is already complex and 
draining on the state budget. In short, apart from some positive devel-
opments with regard to the promotion of the democratic principles of 
governance, reorganisation seems to have been a failure.
In the current literature on the explanations of reorganisation outcomes, 
the most often cited perspectives are the instrumental-rational perspec-
tive and the power and conflict perspective. This paper proposes that the 
outcome of the attempts to reorganise the Croatian local self-government 
system can at least in part be attributed to the garbage can process of 
decision-making. 
Theory argues that reorganisation situations are especially susceptible to 
garbage can decision-making processes, due to few rules on access and 
engagement. They attract a plethora of participants and problems, and 
become opportunities to reopen dormant questions and discuss ideolo-
gies, ideas, and personal interests. Frequently proposed solutions have 
nothing to do with the basic premises upon which the system under reor-
ganisation operates. The impression is that nothing is off-limits and that 
“anything goes”. This kind of situation has been in place throughout the 
two and a half decades of development of local self-government in Cro-
atia. This was evident prior to the introduction of first post-independ-
ence law on local self-government in 1992, during the decentralisation 
attempts in 2000 and 2001, and in the context of reorganising the mid-
dle level of government in the late 2000s. As Croatian reform initiatives 
progressed, politicians showed little concern for either the technical or 
the democratic purpose of subnational government and were occupied 
instead with numerous other questions, using reorganisation as an oppor-
tunity to endorse arbitrary solutions. 
The paper establishes that some elements of the garbage can model were 
present due to the low administrative capacity of the state and a rapidly 
changing environment. Having gained independence, Croatia first faced 
the challenge of setting up its own administrative system, and many tasks 
were new for the organisations in place. This was made even harder be-
cause the politicians in power aspired to establishing a discontinuity with 
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the older regime at all costs. In that sense, reorganisation also held a sym-
bolic purpose. Additionally, the reorganisation environment was initially 
one of war and a general state of crisis, whilst it was later characterised 
by a changing international context and Croatia being en route to EU 
membership. Not only did accession processes bring new actors to the 
reorganisation arena, but they also, due to the limited attention span of 
politicians, gave rise to new problems, which left local self-government re-
organisation as a “catch-all” type of answer. In order to further shape the 
research agenda on theories behind decision-making in turbulent times 
and immature organisational settings, more comparative studies are need-
ed. It would be particularly useful to compare local reform processes in 
the countries of the Western Balkans region, due to their shared political 
history.
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EXPLAINING LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT REORGANISATION 
IN CROATIA: THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL OF DECISION-
MAKING 
Summary
This article deals with changes to the system of local and regional self-govern-
ment in Croatia between 2003 and 2017. For the most part, reform efforts, 
excluding some positive developments with regard to the promotion of the dem-
ocratic principles of governance, have not been successful. The article addresses 
the question of how to theoretically account for these changes. The aim is to offer 
an understanding of reform failure by focussing on the preceding processes. The 
article begins by establishing that reform efforts in the existing literature on Cro-
atian local- and middle-level government reorganisation have predominantly 
been explained either by means of the rational-instrumental perspective or the 
power and conflict perspective. The former argues that reorganisation outcomes 
are a product of rational decision-makers, who in the early 1990s and after-
wards sought to, for one reason or another, establish centralistic administration 
of public affairs. The latter, on the other hand, proposes that the current local- 
and middle-level government structure is a direct reflection of the power structure 
of the current constellation of political actors. The article goes on to suggest that, 
at least in part, changes made to the system can be attributed to the garbage 
can model of decision-making. This is due to the fact that participation in the 
decision-making arena throughout this period was fluid, the decision-makers’ 
attention scarce and their goals ambiguous, and the definitions of the problems 
unclear.
Keywords: garbage can model, local self-government, reform failure, reorgani-
sation, reform, Croatia  
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REORGANIZACIJA LOKALNE SAMOUPRAVE U HRVATSKOJ: 
ODLUČIVANJE PREMA MODELU “KANTE ZA SMEĆE”
Sažetak
U radu se opisuju promjene u sustavu lokalne i regionalne samouprave u Hrvat-
skoj u razdoblju od 2003. do 2017. Općenito uzevši, pokušaji reforme su bili 
neuspješni, s izuzetkom određenih pozitivnih pomaka vezanih za promicanje 
demokratskih načela. U radu se nastoji odgovoriti na pitanje koja bi teorija 
mogla objasniti promjene do kojih je došlo, a neuspjeh se pokušava objasniti 
razmatranjem procesa koji su mu prethodili. U literaturi se reorganizacija sa-
mouprave na lokalnoj i regionalnoj razini u Hrvatskoj većinom objašnjava iz 
jedne od dviju perspektiva: racionalno-instrumentalne odnosno perspektive moći 
i sukoba. Racionalno-instrumentalna perspektiva zastupa tezu da su pojedini 
ishodi plod racionalnih donositelja odluka koji su s početka 90-ih godina proš-
log stoljeća nadalje iz više razloga nastojali uspostaviti centralizirano uprav-
ljanje. S druge strane, perspektiva sukoba i moći tvrdi da sadašnja struktura 
samouprave na lokalnoj i regionalnoj razini izravno odražava trenutnu podjelu 
moći u političkoj strukturi. U radu se predstavlja ideja da se promjene u sustavu 
mogu bar djelomično pripisati odlučivanju prema modelu “kante za smeće”. 
Razlozi za to nalaze se u činjenici da je u razdoblju od 2003. do 2017. sudje-
lovanje u procesima odlučivanja bilo nedosljedno, oni koji su donosili odluke 
bili su nedovoljno usredotočeni na proces, njihovi su ciljevi bili neodređeni, a 
definicije problema nejasne. 
Ključne riječi: model odlučivanja „kante za smeće“, lokalna samouprava, neu-
spjeh reformi, reorganizacija, reforme, Hrvatska
